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NOTES
PROPERTY DIVISION AND ALIMONY AWARDS:
A SURVEY OF STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
INTRODUCTION
The emphasis in modern divorce statutes has shifted from the
awarding of alimony to the division of property between the spouses.
With the recent enactment of statutes in New York' and Pennsylva-
nia,2 every state in the Union now provides for some form of property
division upon divorce. 3 Under old statutory schemes, alimony was
the norm and was given to the wife almost as a matter of course.4
Although alimony awards are still available in every state except
Texas, 5 various restrictions are now placed on them."
The trend toward property division and away from alimony is a
reflection of a fundamental change in society's conception of marriage
and the duties running from one spouse to another. A married
woman is "no longer seen as a subordinate in a master-servant rela-
tionship, but as a person who enters a voluntary association with the
implication of equal rights, duties, and contributions."" Today,
1. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
2. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
3. See infra pt. III.
4. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. Alimony awards cannot be said
to have been the norm in community property jurisdictions, which have always
divided the marital property rather than focusing on awards of alimony. See infra
notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 71.
6. See infra pt. II(A).
7. Several factors can be seen as having contributed to these changes, including:
(1) the women's liberation movement, which stresses the equality of the sexes in all
phases of American life, see generally C. Bird, What Women Want (1979); (2) the
Supreme Court's decisions on the issue of sex discrimination, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979) (declaring statutes providing alimony only to the wife unconstitu-
tional); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (prohibiting U.S. armed serv-
ices from discriminating between male and female service members in methods used
to award dependent's allowances); (3) the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A
U.L.A. 91 (1979); see infra pt. I(B); and (4) inflation, which has forced more and
more women to work after marriage. In 1970, 40.8% of married women living with
their husbands were employed. In 1979, the figure was 49.4%. U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 402 table 668 (101st ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Statistical Abstract]. During the same time period, the dollar's
purchasing power, as measured by the Consumer Price Index, dropped approxi-
mately 46%. See id. at 476 table 792.
8. Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 Fain. L.Q. 415, 418 (1980). As
early as 1905, one court recognized two views of marriage and the obligations
created by divorce: (1) A spouse acquires a right "of the same character as the right of
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commentators, 9 courts' ° and legislatures"' view marriage as a "part-
nership of co-equals,"' 2 which on divorce is to be liquidated.
The new statutes, like the old ones, direct the court to exercise its
judicial discretion in awarding alimony and making property divi-
sions. 13  "Judicial discretion is probably nowhere more intimately
connected with human relations, nor is it given freer rein" than in this
sensitive area. 14 Although some of the new statutes more successfully
circumscribe judicial discretion than did the old ones, abuse of discre-
tion remains a problem. Appellate courts have noted that the problem
support ... [lost] by the dissolution of the marriage;" (2) a spouse is entitled to a
settlement of "the property rights of the parties and... a distribution of the assets of
the quasi partnership thitherto existing." Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408, 411, 75
N.E. 236, 237 (1905), discussed in Kelso, The Changing Social Setting of Alimony
Law, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 186, 194-95 (1939).
9. Freed & Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 Fam. L.Q. 275, 277 (1973)
("It is fair, to conclude that criteria for property distribution, and to a lesser extent
alimony, has become 'non-fault' oriented, and the current emphasis is upon economic
factors and the trend is toward an approach analogous to the dissolution of a
partnership.") [hereinafter cited as Freed & Foster I]; Foster, Divorce Reform and
the Uniform Act, 18 S.D. L. Rev. 572, 591 (1973) ("[M]odern marriage is a partner-
ship of co-equals. The family assets accumulated during the marital partnership and
attributable to its functioning and division of labor ordinarily should be equally
divided upon divorce ...."); Weyrauch, supra note 8, at 419 ("The ideal of equal-
ity of bargaining power merges inevitably into legal theories of marriage as not just a
contract, but a copartnership for mutual benefit and profit."); Comment, Rehabili-
tative Spousal Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating
Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F. L. Rev. 493, 493 (1978) ("[T]he marital relationship
involves an economic partnership in which the spouses equally share the burdens and
responsibilities of both marriage and dissolution.") [hereinafter cited as Rehabilita-
tive Spousal Support].
10. E.g., Neff v. Neff, 386 So. 2d 318, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("marriage
may indeed be a partnership in the economic area"); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio 2d
399, 413, 350 N.E.2d 413, 422 (1976) (a divorce proceeding is "an action to dissolve,
windup and distribute the assets and liabilities of a partnership").
11. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1981) (community property is to
be divided equally on divorce in the absence of a written agreement or oral stipula-
tion in open court to the contrary); Idaho Code § 32-712(1) (a) (Supp. 1981) (property
to be divided equally unless compelling reasons exist); see Executive Memorandum
from Governor Hugh L. Carey, Husband and Wife-Equal Treatment in Support
Obligations, Matrimonial Actions, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1863 ("marriage relationship is
also an economic partnership").
12. Foster, supra note 9, at 591; cf. Note, The Implied Partnership: Equitable
Alternative to Contemporary Methods of Postmarital Property Distribution, 26 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 221 (1974) (applying Uniform Partnership Act to liquidation of assets
upon divorce, but limiting the discussion to the situation where the husband owns his
own business, not where he is a wage earner).
13. E.g., D.C. Code Encycl. §§ 16-910, -912 (West Supp. 1978-1979); Iowa
Code Ann. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. Geri. Laws §§ 15-5-16, -16.1
(Supp. 1980).
14. Cooey, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 213, 213 (1939).
[Vol. 50
PROPERTY DIVISION & ALIMONY
of unchecked discretion is aggravated by the inadequacies of the trial
court records, '5 caused by insufficient findings of fact and conclusions
of law by the courts, and lack of statutory provision for financial
disclosure. Some discretion is necessary because each case must be
decided on its own facts and equity requires flexibility.' 6 Similar
situations in the same state, however, should not lead to vastly differ-
ent results depending on which judge or jury hears the case. Guide-
lines can and should be included in a divorce statute to provide for
uniformity of decision within each state and to give lower court judges
a framework within which discretion is to be exercised. These guide-
lines, however, should be addressed to the specific purpose that ali-
mony or property division is to serve. As the Nebraska Legislature has
stated,
[w]hile the criteria for reaching a reasonable division of property
and a reasonable amount of alimony may overlap, the two serve
different purposes .... The purpose of a property division is to
distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties. The
purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued maintenance or
support of one party by the other when the relative economic
circumstances ... make it appropriate. 7
The purpose of this Note is to examine the statutory powers granted
to the courts to divide property and award alimony in the absence of a
written settlement agreement.' 8 The Note analyzes the guidance
provided by the alimony and property division provisions of the stat-
utes on such questions as what marital property is and what property
is to be divided between the parties. In addition, it discusses the
restrictions placed on the granting of alimony and the factors to be
considered in deciding the amount of alimony and in making the
property division. The guidance provided by these factors is examined
to determine whether or not they are appropriate considerations for
an award of alimony or for a division of property. It is then suggested
that certain restraints be placed on judicial discretion by including
provisions for financial disclosure and written findings of fact in all
divorce statutes, thereby providing a meaningful record for appellate
review.
15. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 602, 244 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1978); see In re
Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), overrulcd on other grounds,
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977).
16. W. Walsh, A Treatise on Equity 43 (1930); see R. Newman, Equity and Law
15 (1961).
17. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Supp. 1980).
18. Every state in the Union allows a couple to settle the division of property by
written agreement on divorce. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 502 (Smith-Hurd 1980);
Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-10 (Burns Supp. 1979); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B
(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); see H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations 521
(1968) [hereinafter cited as H. Clark I].
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ALIMONY AND PROPERTY DIVISION
The American law of alimony and property division derives from
two separate bodies of law. Alimony had its origins in the English
Ecclesiastical law.' 9 The community property concept, on the other
hand, was part of the civil-law tradition in the French and Spanish
territories of the American West and South. 20 Although alimony was
available in all but one of the community property states,21 the con-
cept of property division did not appear in the common-law jurisdic-
tions of the United States until after 1969, when drafting began on the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
22
A. The Common-Law and Civil-Law Traditions
Under English common law, a wife's interest in her husband's
property did not arise unless he predeceased her.2 3 Upon her mar-
riage, however, control of a woman's real and personal property
passed to her husband.2 4 A married woman had no standing in the
19. H. Clark I, supra note 18, at 420-21.
20. Younger, Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum. 48
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 211, 214-15 (1973).
21. See Younger, supra note 20, at 245. Alimony is still available in all the
community property states, except Texas. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319 (1976): Cal.
Civ. Code § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 32-705 (Supp. 1981); La. Civ.
Code Ann. art. 160 (West Supp. 1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1)(a) (1979): N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 40-4-7(B)(1), -12 (1978); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.090 (Supp.
1981).
22. 9A U.L.A. 91 (1979); see infra pt. I(B).
23. C. Donahue, T. Kauper, P. Martin, Cases and Materials on Property 564
(1974) [hereinafter cited as C. Donahue]; W. Walsh, A Treatise on the Law of
Property § 114 (2d ed. 1937). The wife's right, called dower, was inchoate and
non-transferable during the marriage. Upon her husband's death, she acquired not
seisin in her husband's real property, as he did in hers, but a right against her
husband's heirs to have one-third of the land assigned to her for life. C. Donahue.
supra, at 564; W. Walsh, supra, § 114.
24. C. Donahue, supra note 23, at 564. A wife's personal property could be sold
by her husband, was subject to execution for his debts and, except for chattels real,
could be disposed of by the husband in his will. Only if he predeceased her did her
chattels become her own again. As far as her real property was concerned, -[u]pon
marriage the husband obtained an estate jure uxoris. . . in all land of which his wife
was actually seised or became seised during the marriage. This estate gave him the
absolute right to all the rents and profits from that land, so long as both parties
lived." Id. at 564; W. Walsh, supra note 23, § 130. Once a living child was born to
them, the husband's estate, now known as curtesy initiate, was lengthened to an
estate in her property for his life, even if she predeceased him. If a wife did
predecease her husband, his estate became known as curtesy consummate, and he
became solely seised of an estate for life in all her land. C. Donahue, supra note 23,
at 564; W. Walsh, supra note 23, § 131.
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law courts unless her husband was joined with her.2 She therefore
had no legal remedy if she wished to leave him and consequently was
forced to go to equity for relief. 26 Prior to 1857,27 the Ecclesiastical
courts exercised jurisdiction in matrimonial actions.2 These courts
did not grant the parties a divorce as the term is understood today.
They authorized only divorces a mensa et thoro,29 allowing the hus-
band and wife to live apart, but not ending the marriage bond.3
Imposing alimony, therefore, was merely a way to continue the hus-
band's common-law duty to support his wife. 3 1 If the wife were the
"guilty" party,32 no alimony was allowed; the husband's common-law
duty of support lasted only so long as his wife cohabited with him or
lived apart because of his misconduct.3 3  The amount of alimony
awarded was in the discretion of the Ecclesiastical judge, who consid-
ered such items as the wife's needs, the husband's ability to pay, the
amount of wealth the husband acquired from the wife by the mar-
riage and the extent of the husband's fault. 34
Although the English Ecclesiastical courts did not grant absolute
divorces, American courts have done so since colonial times, and have
granted alimony as an incident to absolute divorce. 35 The American
courts' power to grant alimony was statutory in origin 36 and has been
justified by the judiciary on various grounds: as a continuance of the
25. C. Donahue, supra note 23, at 563. "'She could not, without her husband's
being a party to the transaction, convey property inter vivos or by will or enter into
contracts, nor could she sue or be sued without her husband being a party to the
action." Id.
26. Kelso, supra note 8, at 191.
27. The Divorce Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Viet. ch. 85, stripped Ecclesiastical courts
of divorce jurisdiction and established absolute divorce by judicial decree. Vernier &
Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory
Structure, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 197, 197-98 (1939).
28. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 27, at 197-98.
29. Id. at 197. A divorce a mensa et thoro is comparable to a modern judicial
separation. The Ecclesiastical courts could also declare the marriage invalid ab
initio, because of some impediment existing at the time of the marriage, by granting
a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. A private act of Parliament could also dissolve a
marriage, but very few were given. Id. at 197-98 & n.6.
30. H. Clark I, supra note 18, at 420.
31. Id.
32. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 27, at 199. Divorce a nensa et thoro was
granted only for "very serious and aggravated types of marital transgressions." Id. at
198.
33. Id. at 199.
34. Id. at 198-99.
35. H. Clark I, supra note 18, at 421.
36. Id. at 421.
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support to which the wife was entitled during the marriage, 37 as
damages for the husband's wrongdoing, 38 or as a penalty imposed on a
guilty husband. 39
The irony of continuing the ties of dependency after the bonds of
the marriage have been severed "is not obviated by labelling alimony
a 'substitute' for the wife's right to support. Why should there be such
a substitute? Would it not be more logical to say that when the
marriage is dissolved all rights and duties based upon it end? "40
One way to achieve such finality is by division of marital property
instead of an award of alimony on the dissolution of the marriage.
Property division has long been the focus of the civil-law community
property system, which predates common-law principles. The notion
of marriage as a "community" is found in such ancient sources as "the
Code of Hammurabi, the Twelve Tables of Gortyn and the Fuero
Juzgo, or Visigothic Code. ' 41 Having appeared in the United States
as part of the civil-law system of the Spanish and French, it is the law
today in eight states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas and Washington. 42
37. E.g., Dayton v. Dayton, 290 Ky. 418, 423, 161 S.W.2d 618, 621 (1942);
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 124 N.E.2d 485, 489-90 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1954); Bray v. Landergren,
161 Va. 699, 705-06, 172 S.E. 252, 254 (1934).
38. Driskill v. Driskill, 181 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
39. E.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 202 Ark. 740, 741, 151 S.W.2d 998, 998-99 (1941);
Gussman v. Gussman, 140 Ind. 433, 435-36, 39 N.E. 918, 918 (1895); Poppe v.
Poppe, 114 Ind. App. 348, 352, 52 N.E.2d 506, 507 (1944).
40. H. Clark I, supra note 18, at 421.
41. Younger, supra note 20, at 214. In a footnote, Professor Younger quotes
certain relevant provisions from the three codes. Section 152 of the Hammurabi Code
provides: " 'If, after that woman has entered the man's house they incur debt, both
of them must satisfy the trader.' " Id. at 214 n.15. Section 3 of the Twelve Tables of
Gortyn reads: " 'If a man and woman separate, she shall have her own things, which
she had when she went to the man, and the half of the fruit, if it be from her own
goods, and ... whatever it be [of] whatever she has woven.' " Id. The Visigothic
Code, Book IV, tit. II, xvi states: "When persons of equal rank marry one another,
and, while living together, either increase or waste their property, where one Is more
wealthy than the other; they shall share in common the gains and losses, in propor-
tion to the amount which each one holds. If the value of their possessions is the same,
neither has a right to assume superiority over the other. For, it is not unusual, where
such property is equal in amount, for one party, in some way, to take advantage of
the other. And if it should be evident that the possessions of one exceed those of the
other in value, as above stated, there shall be an apportionment of it made, showing
what either shall have the right to claim after the death of the other, and what either
shall have a right to dispose of to his or her children, or to heirs, or in any other way
that may be desired. This provision shall apply to, and be observed in, all cases
relating to the estates of both husbands and wives." Id.
42. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-211 (1976); Cal. Civ. Code § 5110 (West Supp.
1981); Idaho Code § 32-906 (Supp. 1981); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West Supp.
1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.22 (1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(B) (1978); Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030
(Supp. 1981).
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Under the community property system, property owned by a spouse
before the marriage or acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent
during the marriage remains the separate property of the spouse. 43
Income earned by either spouse during the marriage, or property
acquired with such income, is the joint property of both spouses.44
Traditionally, the husband controlled the community property while
the marriage lasted. 45 Within the last ten years, all community prop-
erty states have modified their statutes to provide for joint manage-
ment and control. 46
The "community property" concept suggests that the husband and
wife are partners and that the property will be equally divided on
divorce. As of 1973, however, only two of the eight community prop-
erty states mandated an equal division of community property. 47 In
the other six community property states, the wife could "thus lose
what she supposedly owns or take twice as much.1 48  Today, no
community property state statutorily requires equal division in all
cases. 49  Absent an agreement between the parties, the power to
decide how the property is to be divided rests with the judge.W In
resolving this issue, courts in community property states have em-
ployed factors similar to those considered by the English courts.5'
Other items considered are peculiar to the community property sys-
tem, such as sources and dates of acquisition of the property, and
contributions each spouse made to the marital community. 52
The civil-law system is preferable to the common law in that each
spouse has control of his or her separate property upon separation.0
43. C. Donahue, supra note 23, at 569.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-214(B) (1976); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5125, 5127
(West Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 32-912 (Supp. 1981); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2346
(West Supp. 1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.230 (1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-3-13,
-14 (1978); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 5.22 (Vernon 1975); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1981). See generally Community Property Symposium, 39
La. L. Rev. 323 (1979) (Louisiana's joint management statute); Laughran, Manage-
ment and Control of Community Property in California: "Retroactive" Application
of the 1975 Amendments, 9 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 493 (1976) (California's joint manage-
ment statute); Symposium: Equal Management of Community Property, 13 Idaho L.
Rev. 133 (1977) (primary emphasis on Idaho's joint management statute).
47. Younger, supra note 20, at 242.
48. Id.
49. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
50. DeRuwe v. DeRuwe, 72 Wash. 2d 404, 408, 433 P.2d 209, 212 (1967);
Daggett, Division of Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 225, 227-28; (1939); Younger, supra note 20, at 242-43.
51. See DeRuwe v. DeRuwe, 72 Wash. 2d 404, 408, 433 P.2d 209, 212 (1967);
Daggett, supra note 50, at 227-28; supra text accompanying note 34.
52. See Daggett, supra note 50, at 227-29.
53. See Younger, supra note 20, at 227-28.
1981]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In addition, the adverse psychological effects of alimony on the payor
and recipient are alleviated by a division of property that does not
require the payment of a weekly alimony check. Although civil-law
jurisdictions have recently adopted the concept of joint management
and control of community property,55 the system remains far from
perfect. The pervasive problem of unchecked judicial discretion and
its possible abuse permeates property division 56 as it does alimony
awards.57
B. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
Prior to 1969, few substantive changes were made in divorce stat-
utes, "although criticism of the divorce law was constant, sharp and
often well informed. 58 In that year, a report of the special commit-
tee on divorce appointed by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws was submitted and drafting soon
began on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA). 5 A final
version of the Act was approved in 1971.1o
The UMDA embodied radical changes in traditional thinking. It
adopted irretrievable marriage breakdown as the sole ground for
divorce, rather than fault grounds such as adultery or desertion,0 1 and
54. Peele, Social and Psychological Effects of the Availability and the Granting
of Alimony on the Spouses, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 283 (1939). Peele noted that
"[a]limony is a concrete thing around which all the feelings concerning the divorce
... are likely to gather .... [A]limony goes on after the divorce suit has been
settled. Animosities that might otherwise have burnt out with the passing of time
may be rekindled each time a check is mailed .... [T]he husband may find the
paying of alimony a constant source of annoyance, while the wife may be irritated
each time the check arrives because it is no larger." Id. at 283-84.
55. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
56. Daggett, supra note 50.
57. Cooey, supra note 14.
58. H. Clark, Cases and Problems on Domestic Relations 9 (2d ed. 1974) [herein-
after cited as H. Clark If].
59. R. Levy, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation: A Preliminary Analysis
(undated) (unpublished report prepared for the Special Comm. on Divorce of the
Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws); H. Clark II, supra note 58, at 10,
60. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (1971) (current version at 9A U.L.A. 91
(1979)); Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Handbook of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 65 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
1971 Commissioners' Handbook]. The first draft of the UMDA was approved by the
Commissioners in 1970. Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Handbook of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Unform State Laws 108 (1970). It was
reviewed, amended and approved again in 1971. 1971 Commissioners' Handbook,
supra, at 65.
61. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 305, 9A U.L.A. 132 (1979). The trend
away from fault grounds as the sole basis for a divorce began in 1969, when states
began to list irretrievable marriage breakdown as a ground for divorce, though many
retained fault grounds as well. H. Clark II, supra note 58, at 10. But see Note, The
Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property Awards, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 133-34 &
(Vol. 50422
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proposed new standards for alimony and property division. With
respect to the latter, the UMDA advocated a community property
type of property division as the "preferred method of providing for the
financial needs of a spouse." 6 2 Using the term "marital property,"
the UMDA's definition closely approximated the traditional commu-
nity property definition. Non-marital property was defined as prop-
erty acquired before the marriage, or after the marriage if acquired
"(1) . . . by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (2) . . . in exchange for
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (3) . . . by a
spouse after a decree of legal separation; (4) . . . by valid agreement
of the parties; and (5) [by] the increase in value of property acquired
before the marriage. "63 In addition, alimony was to be limited only
to situations where a spouse lacked sufficient property for his reason-
able needs and was unable to support himself through appropriate
employment or was the custodian of a child and therefore could not
work.64 The thrust of these provisions of the UMDA was to limit
judicial discretion, first, by allowing the court to divide only marital
property, not the separate property of the spouses,6 5 and second, by
restricting alimony to situations where the above mentioned findings
of fact are first made.66
n.2 (1974) (arguing that the trend away from fault grounds began a century ago with
the concepts of separation and incompatibility) [hereinafter cited as Economics].
Only two states, Illinois and South Dakota, still limit divorce to traditional "fault
grounds." Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 40, § 401(2) (Smith-Hurd 1980); S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. § 25-4-2 (1976); Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Over-
view, 14 Faro. L.Q. 229, 241 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Freed & Foster II].
62. Note, Property, Maintenance, and Child Support Decrees Under The Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D. L. Rev. 559, 566 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Property]; see Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 308 comment, 9A U.L.A. 161
(1979). Its critics accused the UMDA of importing an alien community property
concept and forcing it upon non-community property states. See Podell, The Casefor
Revision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D. L. Rev. 601, 607 (1973).
63. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307(b), 9 U.L.A. 491 (1972) (amended
1973). Since the amendment in 1973, a definition of non-marital property no longer
appears in the UMDA. Section 307 now has two alternative versions, each of which
allows the court to divide both marital and separate property. The definition,
therefore, is no longer necessary. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307 Alterna-
ive A, 9A U.L.A. 142 (1979); id. Alternative B, 9A U.L.A. 143 (1979).
64. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 160 (1979).
65. Property, supra note 62, at 566. Barring courts from dividing separate prop-
erty "[w]ithout question . . . does restrict the trial court's traditional freedom in
decreeing a property settlement. That freedom is restricted in an attempt to cure
what is viewed as excess, and sometimes abused, discretion." Id.
66. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
1981]
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The UMDA met with extensive criticism at the time of its promul-
gation . 7 Only five states enacted it. 68  The UMDA, however, has
had a greater impact on present statutes than such lack of acceptance
would indicate. The division of property is now the main thrust of
most divorce statutes,6 9 and alimony awards are subject to a myriad of
restrictions. 70  While these basic premises of the UMDA are now
embodied in the statutes of most states, each state has chosen its own
method of dividing property, and each applies its own restrictions to
the awarding of alimony.
II. ALIMONY
Alimony is available in every state but Texas, 71 and can be awarded
in addition to the property division. Most states now regard alimony
67. See Foster, supra note 9; Podell, supra note 62; Property, supra note 62, at
566-67; Note, Reconciliation and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D. L.
Rev. 611 (1973). Unhappy with the original version, the ABA Family Law Section
drafted a revised version of the UMDA, which was adopted by the Family Law
Section Council on November 9, 1972. A Symposium On The Uniform Marriage And
Divorce Act, 18 S.D. L. Rev. 531, 693 (1973).
68. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-311 to -381.24 (1976 & Supp. 1980-1981); Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 14-2-101 to -113, -10-101 to -124 (1973 & Supp. 1978); I11. Ann. Stat.
ch. 40, §§ 101-707 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 403.010, .110-.350
(Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1980); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 48-301 to -341 (Supp.
1977). After the amendment to § 307 in 1973, see supra note 63, Alternative A was
adopted in Arizona and Montana and Alternative B in Colorado and Kentucky. Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-318 (1976); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-113 (1974 & Supp. 1978);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §
48-321 (Supp. 1977). Illinois' statute is based, for the most part, on the original § 307.
See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503 historical and practice notes (Smith-Hurd 1980).
69. See infra pt. III.
70. See infra pt. II(A).
71. Ala. Code § 30-2-51 (Supp. 1979); Alaska Stat. § 09.55.210(3) (Supp. 1981);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319 (1976); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1211 (Supp. 1981); Cal.
Civ. Code § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114 (1974); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-82 (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512 (Supp.
1980); D. C. Code Encycl. § 16-912 (West Supp. 1978-1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.08
(West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-209 (Supp. 1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §
580-47(a)(2) (Supp. 1980); Idaho Code § 32-705 (Supp. 1981); I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 40,
§ 504 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-9(c) (Burns Supp. 1981); Iowa
Code Ann. § 598.21(3) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1610(d) (Supp.
1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.200 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); La. Civ. Code
Ann. art. 160 (West Supp. 1981); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 721 (1981); Md. Ann.
Code art. 16, § 1 (1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.23(1) (Supp. 1981-1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.552
(West Supp. 1981); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
452.335 (Vernon 1977); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 48-322 (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 42-365 (Supp. 1980); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1)(a) (1979); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 458:19 (1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 40-4-7(B)(1), -12 (1978); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6) (McKin-
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"as a supplement to what is derived from a distribution of marital
property."7 2 The trend is to use the term "maintenance," as does the
UMDA, instead of "alimony," to describe "an award made in a [di-
vorce] proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of
one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other."' 73  The
change in terminology may be due to the negative connotations
evoked by the historical background of alimony74 and also to the
radical change in the purpose of the award: Alimony today is rehabili-
tative in nature.75 Its objective is providing the more needy spouse
with the "ability to become financially independent," 71 instead of
fostering dependence upon the weekly alimony check from an ex-
spouse. As a result, legislatures have begun to impose, as the UMDA
advocated, 77 "a duty to seek employment, unless there is some reason
to avoid that obligation. ' 78 This trend is evident from the statutory
restrictions now applied to the awarding of alimony.
A. Alimony Restrictions
Restrictions placed on alimony awards can be divided into three
basic groups: those addressing the needs of the party seeking alimony;
ney Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.5 (1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-
24 (1971); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18 (Page 1980); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §
1278 (West Supp. 1980-1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(1)(c) (1979); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 23, § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1980);
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §
25-4-41 (Supp. 1980); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-820(a)(1), (2), -821 (Supp. 1981); Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 754 (Supp. 1981); Va.
Code § 20-107 (Supp. 1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.090 (Supp. 1981); W.
Va. Code §§ 48-2-15, -16 (1980); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.26 (West Supp. 1981); Wyo.
Stat. § 20-2-114 (1977). See generally Freed & Foster II, supra note 61, at 252-57
(annual survey of family law statutes).
72. Freed & Foster I, supra note 9, at 277-78.
73. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.54(3) (West Supp. 1981); accord, e.g., Hawaii Rev.
Stat. § 580-47(a)(2) (Supp. 1980); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.090 (Supp. 1981). Some statutes
use neither the term alimony nor the term maintenance. Cal. Ci'. Code § 4801(a)
(West Supp. 1981) (an amount "for the support of the other party"); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 598.21(3) (West Supp. 1981-1982) ("support payments"); Or. Rev. Stat. §
107.105(1)(c) (1979) ('support of a party").
74. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
75. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.08(1) (West Supp. 1981) ("alimony may be rehabili-
tative or permanent in nature"); Rehabilitative Spousal Support, supra note 9, at
495-96 (The rehabilitative approach "benefits both parties. The recipient is provided
with the means to acquire or regain the skills necessary for financial independence,
thus promoting the earliest possible severance of the spouses' economic ties." (foot-
notes omitted)); 3 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 127, 135 (1980) ("Rehabilitative alimony
recognizes that a marriage often imparts an economic disadvantage upon the sup-
ported spouse." (footnote omitted)).
76. Rehabilitative Spousal Support, supra note 9, at 495.
77. See supra notes 64 & 66 and accompanying text.
78. Property, supra note 62, at 567.
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those addressing the fault of the alimony seeker; and those placing
arbitrary legislative restrictions on the courts' power to award ali-
mony.
1. Need
Several states require the court, before awarding alimony, to find
as a fact that the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property to
provide for his or her needs, including whatever share of marital
property has been awarded, and that the party cannot find employ-
ment or cannot work because he or she has custody of the children.7"
New York requires a judge to find both that the party lacks sufficient
property and income to provide for his or her needs and that the other
spouse has sufficient property and income to provide for them. 0
Alabama, which has no provision for marital property division in its
statutory scheme, will allow alimony on a finding that a spouse has no
separate estate or that the separate estate is insufficient for self-sup-
port.8' The only property from which the alimony is payable, how-
ever, is that acquired during the marriage, exclusive of gifts and
inheritances, unless it is also found that such property has been "used
regularly for the common benefit of the parties during their mar-
riage." 82
Restricting alimony by requiring the trial court to make findings of
fact on the issue of need is consistent with the rehabilitative nature of
alimony. It will, in addition, provide the appeals court with the
foundation on which to base its review of the trial court's decision.
2. Fault
The presence of a fault ground still bars or diminishes an award of
alimony in many states. Some statutes enumerate specific fault
grounds, such as adultery8 3 or desertion,8 4 as complete bars to ali-
mony. Others allow only an "innocent" spouse to receive alimony.85
Still others provide that commission of a fault ground is a factor to be
79. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319 (1976); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114(1) (1973):
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 504(a) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.200(1)
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.552(1) (West Supp. 1980): Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 452.335(1) (Vernon 1977); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 48-322(1) (Supp.
1977); cf. Idaho Code § 32-705(1) (Supp. 1981) (child custody not explicitly consid-
ered in the fact finding); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982)
(same).
80. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
81. Ala. Code § 30-2-51 (Supp. 1979).
82. Id.
83. Ga. Code Ann. § 30-201 (1980); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-15.6(a) (1976): S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980).
84. Ga. Code Ann. § 30-201 (1980).
85. Idaho Code § 32-705(1) (Supp. 1981); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 160 (West
Supp. 1981); Va. Code § 20-107 (Supp. 1980).
[Vol. 50
PROPERTY DIVISION & ALIMONY
considered and, therefore, may diminish an award of alimony. 86 With
respect to fault grounds, each state must make a policy choice: to
follow the common-law notion that the duty of support ends when a
spouse is guilty of misconduct, or to base the alimony decision on need
instead of guilt or innocence. Using fault grounds to bar or lower
alimony awards hardly seems consistent with the present concept of
alimony as a rehabilitative tool. If alimony is awarded on the basis of
need, denying alimony for a fault ground will probably result in the
party applying for state welfare payments. At most, then, fault
grounds should diminish alimony only to an amount that would pre-
vent the party from being eligible to receive welfare and no further.
Otherwise, the burden of supporting the party will be placed on the
state.
8 7
3. Time and Amount
Many of the present statutes allow courts, in their discretion, to
limit alimony awards to a specific period of time.8 8 Several states set
specific time limitations on alimony awards. In Delaware, alimony
can be awarded only for two years unless the couple has been married
for at least twenty years; 9 in New Hampshire, alimony is limited to
three years, but may be renewed for additional three year periods.90
Absent specific findings of fact, courts in two states must set specific
time limits on alimony. In Pennsylvania, the party receiving alimony
has a reasonable time to meet his or her needs by obtaining employ-
ment or developing a marketable skill, unless the court finds that the
party's ability to do so is "substantially diminished by reason of age,
physical, mental or emotional condition, custody of minor children,
or other compelling impediment to gainful employment.""' In Mary-
land, alimony can be awarded for an indefinite period only when the
court "finds as a fact that: (i) The party seeking alimony, by reason of
age, illness, infirmity, or disability, cannot reasonably be expected to
make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting; or (ii)
Even after the receiving party will have made as much progress
toward self-support as can reasonably be expected, the respective
86. Ala. Code § 30-2-52 (Supp. 1979); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 1(a) (1981); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.5(b) (1976);
cf. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.08(1) (West Supp. 1981) (adultery only).
87. Daggett, supra note 50, at 234.
88. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319(B) (1976); Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a)
(West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981).
89. Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(a)(3) (Supp. 1980) (limited to cases where the
divorce is not for mental illness).
90. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:19 (1968) (limitation applies only in cases where
there are no children or the children have reached the age of majority).
91. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 501(c) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
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standards of living of the two parties will be unconscionably dispar-
ate."92
Louisiana restricts not the time for receipt, but the amount: Ali-
mony is limited to one-third of the other spouse's income.0 3 Indiana
allows maintenance to be paid only to a spouse who is "physically or
mentally incapacitated. . . during any such incapacity."0 4
Specific arbitrary limitations on the time or amount of an alimony
award do not provide enough flexibility for case-by-case decision. On
the other hand, allowing the court, in its discretion, to decide whether
to impose a specific time limit is not conducive to uniformity of
decision. Restrictions, such as those imposed by Pennsylvania and
Maryland, can provide a framework within which discretion can be
exercised. Such flexibility will avoid arbitrary limits that will not only
be inequitable in some situations but also require the parties to return
to the court repeatedly to have the alimony award reexamined, thus
overcrowding court calendars.
B. Factors Considered in Alimony Awards
Once the property division has been made and a party has met
whatever standard is necessary in a given state to be eligible for
alimony, the court must determine the amount of the alimony award.
Thirty states95 list specific factors96 for the court to consider in making
this determination. No one factor of the twenty-eight listed is common
to all the statutes.
92. Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 1(c)(1) (1981).
93. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 160 (West Supp. 1981).
94. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-9(c) (Burns Supp. 1981).
95. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319(B)(1)-(8) (1976); Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a)(1)-
(9) (West Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114(2)(a)-(f) (1973); Conn. Cen.
Stat. Ann. § 46b-82 (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(c)(1)-(7)
(Supp. 1980); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.08(1), (2)(a)-(f) (West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code
Ann. § 30-209(a)(1)-(8) (Supp. 1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 580-47(a)(1)-(13) (Supp.
1980); Idaho Code § 32-705 2(a)-(f) (Supp. 1981); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 504(b)(1)-
(6) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(3)(a)-(j) (West Supp. 1981-1982);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.200(2)(a)-(f) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); La. Civ. Code
Ann. art. 160 (West Supp. 1981); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § l(b)(1)-(11) (1981);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
518.552(2)(a)-(g) (West Supp. 1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.335(2)(1)-(7) (Vernon
1977); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 48-322(2)(a)-(f) (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. §
42-365 (Supp. 1980); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(a)(1)-(10) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50-16.5(a) (1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18(B)(1)-(11) (Page 1980); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 107.105(1)(c)(A)-(I), (2) (1979); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 501(b)(1)-(14) (Pur-
don Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1980); Va. Code § 20-
107(l)-(6) (Supp. 1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.090(1)(a)-(f) (Supp. 1981);
W. Va. Code § 48-2-16 (1980); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.26(1)-(10) (West Supp. 1981).
96. The following factors are listed in order of frequency of use, with parentheti-
cal indications of the number of states using each factor: 1. the financial resources of
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If alimony is to be a rehabilitative tool and to provide support to the
ex-spouse only until he or she is capable of self-support,9 7 all the
factors considered in awarding alimony should address the issue of
need. Only seventeen of the twenty-eight factors do so.96 Significant
factors include: the financial resources of each, including whatever
share of marital property each was awarded;99 age and health; 00 time
needed for the education of the party seeking alimony;' 0' child sup-
port responsibilities;10 2 and the ability of the other spouse to pay.10 3
each, including whatever share of marital property each was awarded (28); 2.
duration of the marriage (27); 3. age and health (26); 4. station in life/standard of
living (23); 5. time needed for the education of the party seeking support (20); 6.
child support responsibilities, including the ability to work while having custody of
the children (19); 7. earning capacity of each (16); 8. the ability of the other spouse to
pay (14); 9. needs of the parties (11); 10. contribution to the marriage, including as a
homemaker (11); 11. other just and equitable factors (10); 12. tax consequences (6);
13. the cause of the divorce (6); 14. occupation and vocational skills (6); 15. the
educational level of the parties (5); 16. the contribution by one spouse to the other's
education (5); 17. employment history (4); 18. retirement benefits (3); 19. agree-
ments of the parties (antenuptial and/or separation) (3); 20. the property interests of
each (3); 21. interruption of career or education (3); 22. expectancies and inheri-
tances (2); 23. the property brought to the marriage (2); 24. the duration of the need
of support (2); 25. the conduct of the party seeking support (2); 26. dissipation of
assets (2); 27. insurance (1); and 28. excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction,
concealment or fraudulent disposition of property held in common (1). See Appendix
A for a chart of the factors, listed by state. Each number that appears in the vertical
column of the chart identifies the factor introduced by the same number in this
footnote.
97. If the ex-spouse is unemployable as a result of age or illness, however,
permanent alimony is appropriate because rehabilitation is unlikely.
98. Those factors are: 1. the financial resources of each, including whatever
share of martial property each was awarded; 2. age and health; 3. time needed for
the education of the party seeking support; 4. child support responsibilities, including
the ability to work while having custody of the children; 5. earning capacity of each;
6. the ability of the other spouse to pay; 7. needs of the parties; 8. occupation and
vocational skills; 9. the educational level of the parties; 10. employment history; 11.
retirement benefits; 12. agreements of the parties (antenuptual and/or separation);
13. the property interests of each; 14. interruption of career or education; 15.
expectancies and inheritances; 16. the duration of the need of support; and 17.
insurance.
99. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a)(3) (West Supp. 1981); La. Civ. Code Ann.
art. 160 (West Supp. 1981); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § l(b)(1) (1981).
100. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-82 ("West Supp. 1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
61.08(2)(c) (West Supp. 1981); IUI. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 504(b)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1980).
101. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114(2)(b) (1973); Iowa Code Ann. §
598.21(3)(e) (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(a)(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
102. E.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 160 (West Supp. 1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
518.552(2)(a) (West Supp. 1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 501(b)(7) (Purdon Supp.
1981-1982).
103. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.200(2)(f) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Mo.




Two other factors are relevant to alimony determinations for different
reasons. Tax consequences 10 4 should be considered in the interest of
fairness because -alimony is treated as income to the recipient and is
deductible by the payor. s05 In addition, inclusion of a factor such as
other just and equitable considerations 10 provides a convenient catch-
all so that unusual situations can be adjusted fairly.
Because they relate to assets of the marriage, not the needs of the
parties, five factors are more relevant to the question of property
division than to alimony: contribution to the marriage, including
services rendered as a homemaker; 0 7 the property brought to the
marriage; 10 8 the contribution by one spouse to the other's educa-
tion; 0 9 dissipation of assets;" 0 and excessive or abnormal expendi-
tures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition of property
held in common."' If one party has substantially dissipated the
marital assets and the court in a particular state has no power to
invade the separate property of the parties in making a property
division,1 2 however, consideration of one of the latter two factors in
granting an alimony award becomes necessary to achieve equity be-
tween the parties.
104. Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(c)(7) (Supp. 1980); Idaho Code § 32-705(2)(f)
(Supp. 1981); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(3)(g) (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(a)(7) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Or. Rev. Stat. §
107.105(2) (1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.26(7) (West Supp. 1981).
105. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (1976). See generally Hopkins, Tax Aspects of Divisions of
Co-owned Property at the Time of Divorce, 69 Ill. B.J. 488 (1981); Lewis, Income
Tax Planning at Divorce or Separation, 5 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 445 (1980).
106. Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a)(9) (West Supp. 1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.08(2)
(West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-209(a)(8) (Supp. 1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §
580-47(a) (Supp. 1980); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(3)6) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Md.
Ann. Code art. 16, § l(b)(11) (1981); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(a)(10)
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(1)(c)(I) (1979); Va. Code §
20-107(6) (Supp. 1981); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.26(10) (West Supp. 1981). Several
states provide for consideration of items not on their enumerated list by prefacing the
list of factors with a directive that courts make a just award "after considering all
relevant factors, including" those enumerated. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-
319(B) (1976); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114(2) (1973); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 504(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1980).
107. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.08(f) (West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-209(a)(6)
(Supp. 1981); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § l(b)(6) (1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, §
34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.552(2)(g) (West Supp. 1981);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (1978); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(a)(8) (MeKin-
ney Supp. 1980-1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18(B)(11) (Page 1980); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 23, § 501(b)(12) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); Va. Code § 20-107 (5a) (Supp.
1981).
108. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18(B)(10) (Page 1980); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, §
501(b)(11) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
109. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 501(b)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 767.26(9) (West Supp. 1981).
110. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(a)(9) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
111. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319(B)(7) (1976).
112. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
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The rest of the factors are irrelevant to an award of alimony based
on need. The duration of the marriage,13 for example, has little to do
with financial need." 4 The same is true of the parties' station in
life/standard of living," s as it is the rare case when either part), alone
can maintain the same standard of living as the two had when mar-
113. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319(B)(4) (1976); Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a)(4)
(West Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114(2)(d) (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 46b-82 (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(c)(4) (Supp. 1980); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 61.08(2)(b) (West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-209(a)(2) (Supp.
1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 580-47(a)(3) (Supp. 1980); Idaho Code § 32-705(2)(c)
(Supp. 1981); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 504(b)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 598.21(3)(a) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.200(2)(d) (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § l(b)(5) (1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
208, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.552(2)(d) (West Supp.
1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.335(2)(4) (Vernon 1977); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §
48.322(2)(d) (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42.365 (1978); N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(a)(2) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1980-1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18(B)(5) (Page 1980); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 107.105(1)(c)(A) (1979); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 501(b)(5) (Purdon Supp.
1981-1982); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1980); Va. Code § 20-107(4) (Supp.
1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.090(1)(d) (West Supp. 1981); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 767.26(1) (West Supp. 1981).
114. Factors such as the age and health of the parties, occupational and vocational
skills, educational level, time needed for retraining, employment history, and inter-
ruption of career or education can adequately provide for the party seeking alimony
and are much more pertinent to the spouse's needs than is a consideration of how
long a marriage lasted. Although one commentator has stated that duration of the
marriage "is one of the most important factors courts utilize," she has recognized that
"the length of the marriage measures the extent of the homemaker spouse's absence
from the work force and the probable degree of difficulty she will encounter in
attempting to enter or re-enter it." Rehabilatitive Spousal Support, supra note 9, at
499 (footnote omitted).
115. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319(B)(3) (1976); Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a)(8)
(West Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114(2)(c) (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 46b-82 (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(c)(3) (Supp. 1980); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 61.08(2)(a) (West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-209(a)(1) (Supp.
1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 580-47(a)(4) (Supp. 1980); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, §
504(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.200(2)(c) (Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1980); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 1(b)(4) (1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, §
34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.552(2)(c) (West Supp. 1981);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.335(2)(3) (Vernon 1977); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 48-322(2)(c)
(Supp. 1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.5(a) (1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
3105.18(B)(7) (Page 1980); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 501(b)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1981-
1982); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1980); Va. Code § 20-107(3) (Supp. 1981);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.090(1)(c) (Supp. 1981); cj. N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law §
236 pt. B(6)(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) ("where practical and relevant"). A
commentator has said station in lifelstandard of living "best exemplifies what the
former marital partners consider their reasonable needs to be." Rehabilitative
Spousal Support, supra note 9, at 502. Does not including the needs of the parties as a
factor more adequately take this consideration into account?
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nied."0  Two other factors, the cause of the divorce" 7 and the con-
duct of the party seeking support," 8 are attempts to consider fault in
awarding alimony. Whether fault-related grounds should be consid-
ered is a policy choice to be made by the legislatures. They must
decide whether the state welfare system or the other spouse should
bear the burden of supporting a needy spouse.
Various factors have been considered by courts for years.' 19 By
codifying case law, the legislatures of thirty states have listed specific
items each considers important in awarding alimony, thus giving
judges a convenient checklist of items they are to consider in reaching
decisions. If, indeed, alimony is "to provide necessary sustenance, not
support," 2 0 the factors used should stress need, not such issues as how
long the marriage had lasted or who was responsible for its end.
C. Termination of Alimony
Historically, the death of either party121 or the remarriage of the
spouse receiving alimony12 2 terminated alimony payments. The same
holds true in most states today. 2 3 The number of couples who live
together openly today without getting married 2 4 may have prompted
116. See Economics, supra note 61, at 150.
117. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-82 (West Supp. 1981); Md. Ann. Code art. 16,
§ 1(b)(7) (1981); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 23, § 501(b)(14) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 (Supp.
1980).
118. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.335(2)(7) (Vernon 1977).
119. Cooey, supra note 14, at 217.
120. Economics, supra note 61, at 141.
121. H. Clark I, supra note 18, at 461-63.
122. "The remarriage of the divorced wife is generally assumed to relieve the
alimony-paying husband of the duty of supporting her, inasmuch as assumption of
this obligation by the second husband will usually wipe out the need for further
payments." Desvernine, Groundsfor the Modification of Alimony Awards, 6 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 236, 244 (1939).
123. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 510(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Neb. Rev. Stat. §
42-365 (1978); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(5) (1979); cf. Ala. Code § 30-2-55 (Supp.
1979) (remarriage only); Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(b) (West Supp. 1981) (unless the
parties otherwise agree in writing); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-209 (Supp. 1981) (remar-
riage only, "unless otherwise provided"). Georgia has a unique statute which pro-
vides that if either party dies prior to the court's order on the alimony issue, any
rights of the other party to alimony survive and are considered a lien on the dece-
dent's estate. Ga. Code Ann. § 30-201 (1980). Under New York law, any remarriage,
whether valid or invalid, will terminate alimony. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B
(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). In Utah, however, if the second marriage Is
annulled and found void ab initio and the former spouse is made a party to the
annulment proceeding, the spouse may be able to resume receiving alimony pay-
ments. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(2) (Supp. 1979).
124. The percentage of unmarried couples living together increased from 2.6% of
non-family households in 1970 to 5% in 1979; from 523,000 couples in 1970 to
1,346,000 in 1979. Statistical Abstract, supra note 7, at 44 table 59.
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six states to make specific provision in their alimony statutes to take
into account cohabitation by the alimony recipient. In Alabama,
alimony terminates if the recipient is "living openly or cohabiting
with a member of the opposite sex." 2 5 In Illinois, the award termi-
nates if the recipient is living with another "on a resident, continuing
conjugal basis."' 126  Alimony is also terminable in Utah unless the
recipient establishes that the relationship "is without any sexual con-
tact."12 7 Oklahoma considers cohabitation as grounds to modify the
alimony award, 2 and in California and Tennessee, cohabitation
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the party's need for ali-
mony has decreased. 29 Interestingly, while four of the statutes refer
specifically to cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex,130 two
do not. Illinois uses the phrase "cohabits with another" "3 and Tennes-
see "with a third person."13
Cohabitation provisions address two separate issues: need and fault.
California, Tennessee and Oklahoma appear to reason that if an
alimony recipient is living with another person, the need for the
alimony may have decreased because of the contributions to house-
hold expenses by the other party. This approach is valid if alimony
awards are to be based on need. On the other hand, Alabama and
Illinois provide that proof of cohabitation will result in the complete
termination of alimony, thus punishing a party for "immoral" con-
duct, even if the need for alimony still exists.
III. PROPERTY DIVISION
Prior to making an award of alimony, the court should divide the
marital property between the parties. Only then can a determination
be made as to whether or not an alimony award is necessary. Today,
every state provides for some form of property division upon divorce.
The statutes of Mississippi, Virginia and West Virginia, however,
permit only limited forms of property division. 33 Although there are
125. Ala. Code § 30-2-55 (Supp. 1979).
126. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 510(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980).
127. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1979).
128. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1289(D) (West Supp. 1980-1981).
129. Cal. Civ. Code § 4801.5 (West Supp. 1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-820(3)
(Supp. 1981).
130. Ala. Code § 30-2-55 (Supp. 1979); Cal. Civ. Code § 4801.5 (West Supp.
1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1289(D) (West Supp. 1980-1981); Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1979).
131. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 510(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980).
132. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-820(3) (Supp. 1981).
133. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1980) (if the divorce is granted on grounds
of irreconcilable differences, the parties must make a written agreement "for the
settlement of any property rights between" them); Va. Code § 20-111 (1975) (the
court can equally divide jointly held property, turning a tenancy by the entirety into
a tenancy in common); W. Va. Code § 48-2-21 (1981) (the court can return to a party
1981]
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no explicit property division provisions in the divorce statutes of Ala-
bama, 134 Florida, 135 North Carolina 136 and South Carolina,3 7 these
states employ several theories to allow for a species of property divi-
sion. These theories include the doctrine that a spouse may develop,
by his or her contributions during the marriage, a special equity in
property owned by the other, 38 and the presumption that a spouse
has received a gift of one-half of the property held in joint name.'3
Alabama uses grants of lump sum alimony and periodic payments to
effect both an award of alimony and a division of property. 40 In
South Carolina, the court has jurisdiction to divide property only if
the parties request the court to do so.' 4'
In the rest of the states, specific statutory authority exists to allow
the court to divide the property of the parties. 42  These provisions
vary greatly, however, on such issues as how marital property is
defined, what property is to be divided, how the division is to be
made, and what factors are to be considered in making the division.
property he owns that is in the possession or control of the other spouse). The special
equity doctrine, see infra note 138 and accompanying text, is also available in West
Virginia. Pierce v. Pierce, 274 S.E.2d 514, 515 (W. Va. 1981).
134. Ala. Code §§ 30-2-1 to -55 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
135. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 61.011-.20 (West 1969 & Supp. 1981).
136. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-1 to -19 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
137. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-10 to -230 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1980).
138. Neff v. Neff, 386 So. 2d 318, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Wilson v.
Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 221-22, 241 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (1978).
139. McCready v. MeCready, 356 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
140. Hager v. Hager, 293 Ala. 47, 299 So. 2d 743 (1974). The Alabama Supreme
Court distinguishes between the purposes of alimony in gross and alimony in install-
ments: " 'Alimony in gross' is the present value of the wife's inchoate marital rights-
dower, homestead, quarantine, and distributive share. It is payable out of the
husband's present estate as it exists at the time of divorce .... On the other hand,
'periodic alimony' is an allowance for the future support of the wife payable from the
current earnings of the husband." Id. at 55, 299 So. 2d at 750.
141. Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 312, 204 S.E.2d 46, 48 (1974).
142. Alaska Stat. § 09.55.210(6) (Supp. 1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-318
(Supp. 1980-1981); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4800,
4800.5 (West Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-113 (1974 & Supp. 1978); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81 (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513 (Supp.
1980); D.C. Code Encycl. § 16-910 (West Supp. 1978-1979); Ga. Code Ann. §
30-118 (1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 580-47(a)(3) (Supp. 1980); Idaho Code § 32-712
(Supp. 1981); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980); 1980 Ind. Acts 1573,
1573-74 (to be codified at Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns)); Iowa Code Ann. §
598.21(1) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1610(c) (Supp. 1980); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 159
(West Supp. 1981); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981); Md. Ann. Code art.
16, § 25 (1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.19 (Supp. 1981-1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West
Supp. 1981); 1981 Mo. Legis. Serv. 546, 546-47 (Vernon) (to be codified at Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 452.330 (Vernon)); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 48-321 (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 42-365 (Supp. 1980); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1)(b) (1979); N.H. Rev. Stat.
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A. How Property is Defined
The initial undertaking in a property division is the determination
of what property is divisible. Legislatures have influenced this thresh-
old consideration by designating certain property as marital and other
property as separate. The standard definition of marital property is
"[a]ll property acquired by either husband or wife during the mar-
riage, except that which is acquired by gift, devise or descent." ,43 This
definition is varied in many statutes either by excluding additional
items from the marital property or by adding items to it. By including
a definition of marital property in its statute, a state can make explicit
a policy decision on what items are or are not to be considered, thus
providing the trial court with specific guidelines.
The following items are excluded from "marital property" in var-
ious states: those excluded by agreement of the parties; 44 increases in
the value of a spouse's separate property during the marriage; 45
Ann. § 458:19 (1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 40-4-7(B)(4) (1978); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-24 (1971); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §
1278 (West Supp. 1980-1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(1)(e) (1979); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (Supp.
1980); S.D. Codified Lavs Ann. § 25-4-44 (1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-825 (1977);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 3.63 (Vernon 1975); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1)
(Supp. 1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 751 (1974); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.080
(Supp. 1981); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (Vest Supp. 1981); Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114
(1977). On its face, the Ohio statute seems to provide for alimony alone. See Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18 (Page 1980). The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has
cited the statute to support its contention that a court's primary function in a divorce
proceeding is to preside over the division of the marital property. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46
Ohio St. 2d 399, 411, 350 N.E.2d 413, 421 (1976). See generally Freed & Foster II,
supra note 61, at 249-52.
143. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-211 (1976); see supra notes 43-44 and accompany-
ing text.
144. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(B)(4) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-
113(2)(d) (1973); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(b)(2) (Supp. 1980); I11. Ann. Stat.
ch. 40, § 503(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190(2)(d) (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 722-A(2)(D) (1981); 1981 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 546, 547 (Vernon) (to be codified at Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.330(2)(4)
(Vernon)); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(A)(5) (1978); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt.
B(1)(d)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(e)(2) (Purdon
Supp. 1981-1982); cf. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.54(5)(e) (West Supp. 1981) ("valid
antenuptial contract" only).
145. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(B)(5) (Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. it. 13, §
1513(b)(3) (Supp. 1980); D.C. Code Eneyel. § 16-910(a) (West Supp. 1978-1979); I11.
Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §
722-A(2)(E) (1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.54(5)(c) (West Supp. 1981); 1981 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 546, 547 (Vernon) (to be codified at Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.330(2)(5)
(Vernon)); Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-201 (1977); cf. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190(2)(e)
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980) ("to the extent that such increase did not result from the
efforts of the parties during marriage"); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(1)(d)(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) ("except to the extent that such appreciation is due in
part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse").
1981]
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personal injury awards;14 veteran's benefits; 147 the rents, issues and
proceeds of separate property acquired during the marriage; 48 items
exchanged for or purchased with funds acquired from separate prop-
erty;140 property designated separate by the court; 50 property ac-
quired after the parties separate but before a final decree of di-
vorce; 1, and property disposed of or mortgaged in good faith before
the divorce action is commenced.15 2 Minnesota includes pension ben-
efits as part of the marital property, 15 3 while Iowa adds property
acquired before the marriage.154
Once it is determined which property is marital and which is
separate, a court's next step is to determine what property is to be
divided upon divorce. Instead of making a distinction between mari-
tal and separate property, some statutes give the court the power to
divide all the property of the parties.
B. What Property is Divided
The most common method of dividing property is to return to each
party his or her separate property and then to divide the marital
146. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.130 (1979); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(1)(d)(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); cf. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon
1975) ("except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage"). Califor.
nia allows up to one-half of a personal injury award to be given to the uninjured
spouse if "the court, after taking into account the economic condition and needs of
each party, the time that has elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual
of the cause of action, and all other facts of the case, determines that the interests of
justice require" it. Cal. Civ. Code § 4800(c) (West Supp. 1981).
147. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(e)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
148. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.16.010, .020 (1961); Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-201
(1977).
149. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(B)(2) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10.
113(2)(b) (1973); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(b)(1) (Supp. 1980); D.C. Code
Encycl. § 16-910(a) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Idaho Code § 32-903 (1963); I11. Ann.
Stat. ch. 40, § 503(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190(2)(b)
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2341 (West Supp. 1981); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 722-A(2)(B) (1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.54(5)(c) (West
Supp. 1981); 1981 Mo. Legis. Serv. 546, 547 (Vernon) (to be codified at Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 452.330(2)(2) (Vernon)); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(1)(d)(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(e)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (West Supp. 1981).
150. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(A)(3) (1978).
151. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(B)(3) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-
113(2)(c) (1973); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 403.190(2)(c) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §
722-A(2)(C) (1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.54(5)(d) (West Supp. 1981); 1981 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 546, 547 (Vernon) (to be codified at Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.330(2)(3)
(Vernon)); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(A)(2) (1978); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(e)(4)
(Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
152. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(e)(5), (7) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
153. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.54(5) (West Supp. 1981).
154. Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(1) (West Supp. 1981-1982).
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property "equitably." 155 In several jurisdictions, however, the sepa-
rate property of each party is subject to division by the court. Arkan-
sas will not return separate property if it would be "inequitable" to do
so. 156  Courts in Maryland and New Hampshire are empowered to
return to a wife the property she had when she married or whatever
portion of it is deemed reasonable.'0 Five states allow assignment of
all or part of one spouse's "estate" to the other;'s and South Dakota
provides that the property of either or both can be divided by the
court if the divorce is granted on fault grounds.'5 9
Some statutes give courts power to divide all property acquired
during the marriage, joint or separate, 160 or all property of the parties,
however or whenever acquired. 161 These statutes thus enable courts
to disregard the distinction between marital and separate property.
However, alimony, not property division, is designed to allow for
invasion of one spouse's separate property to provide for the other.162
Any disparity in the amount of property ex-spouses would have upon
divorce, due to differences in the size of their separate estates, can be
corrected, in most cases, not by giving one spouse the other's property,
but by giving the spouse a larger share, or all, of the marital property.
C. How Property is Divided
Most statutes contain no rules concerning the proportion of marital
property to be assigned to each spouse. A court is to decide, in its
discretion, on an equitable, just and reasonable division. 1 3 Certain
155. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-113 (1973 & Supp. 1978); Nev. Rev. Stat. §
125.150(1)(b) (1979); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
156. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(2) (Supp. 1981).
157. Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 25 (1981); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:19 (1968).
158. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46-b-81(a) (Vest Supp. 1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
208, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:19 (1968); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (Supp. 1980); cf. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West Supp.
1981) (if the court finds that the spouse's resources are insufficient, it can apportion
up to one-half of the separate property of the other spouse to prevent undue hard-
ship).
159. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-4-44 (1976).
160. Alaska Stat. § 09.55.210(6) (Supp. 1981); cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23
(West Supp. 1981-1982) (items acquired during marriage by gift, devise or descent,
except for interspousal gifts, are excluded).
161. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 580-47(a)(3) (Supp. 1980); 1980 Ind. Acts 1573, 1573-74
(to be codified at Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Burns)); Kan. Stat. Ann. §
60-1610(c) (Supp. 1980); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 107.105(1)(e) (1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 751 (1974); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1981).
162. Alimony is paid out of earnings received after the divorce; property division
is a division of the present value of the marital property. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
163. E.g., D.C. Code Encycl. § 16-910(b) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Hawaii Rev.




state statutes specify that this equitable division is to be made "with-
out regard to marital misconduct,"'' 6 4 while most are silent on the
issue. Four states require the division of the marital property to be
equal unless specific findings of fact are made: in Arkansas and Wis-
consin, unless such division would be inequitable;16 5 in Idaho, unless
"compelling reasons" exist;16 6 and in California, unless the parties
have a written agreement to the contrary or make an oral stipulation
in open court. 16 7
There can be great disparity in the value of the parties' separate
estates. Leaving the proportion of marital property to be awarded
each spouse to the court, rather than having the division strictly
dictated by statute, therefore, is a better way to provide for equitable
results. If a strictly equal division is mandated by statute, injustice
could result for which the court will have to compensate in an ali-
mony award. If property division is "the preferred method of provid-
ing for the financial needs of a spouse," 6 8 mandatory equal division is
unwise.
D. Factors Considered in Property Division
Statutes in twenty-one jurisdictions60 specifically enumerate fac-
164. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-318(A) (Supp. 1980-1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
14-10-113(1) (Supp. 1978); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (Supp. 1980); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190(1) (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1981); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Supp.
1981-1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1981); accord Alaska Stat. §
09.55.210(6) (1973) ("without regard to which of the parties is in fault"); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 107.036(3) (1979) ("[T]he court shall not consider the fault, if any, of either of
the parties.").
165. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Supp. 1981); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255
(West Supp. 1981). Wisconsin, however, does allow consideration of additional
enumerated factors to permit other than equal property divisions. Id.
166. Idaho Code § 32-712(1)(a) (Supp. 1981).
167. Cal. Civ. Code § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1981).
168. Property, supra note 62, at 566.
169. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1)(1)-(9) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
14-10-113(1)(a)-(d) (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West Supp. 1981);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(1)-(11) (Supp. 1980); D.C. Code Encycl. § 16.
910(b) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Idaho Code § 32-712(1)(b)(1)-(7) (Supp. 1981); I11.
Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503(c)(1)-(10) (Smith-Hurd 1980); 1980 Ind. Acts 1573, 1573-74
(to be codified at Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11(b)(1)-(5) (Burns)); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 598.21(1)(a)-(m) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190(1)(a)-(d)
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 722-A(1)(A)-(C) (1981);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1981); 1981 Mo. Legis. Serv. 546, 546
(Vernon) (to be codified at Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.330(1)(1)-(4) (Vernon)); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(5)(d)(1)-(10)
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(1)(e), (2) (1979); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 23, § 401(d)(1)-(10) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1
(Supp. 1980); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.080(1)-(4) (Supp. 1981); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 767.255(1)-(12) (West Supp. 1981); Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1977).
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tors170 to be considered in making property divisions. As with the
statutory guidelines for alimony, no one factor, of the total of thirty-
eight, appears in all twenty-one statutes. If the purpose of a property
division is "to distribute the marital assets equitably between the
parties,"' 71 all the factors considered in property divisions should be
addressed to an evaluation of such assets. Only twenty-six of the
thirty-eight factors do so. 172  Significant factors addressed to evalua-
170. The following factors are listed in order of frequency of use, with parentheti-
cal indications of the number of states using each factor: 1. the economic circum-
stances of each party at the time of the division, particularly the amount and sources
of income (18); 2. the contribution of each to the acquisition of the marital property,
including contributions as a homemaker (17); 3. the duration of the marriage (15); 4.
the age and health, both physical and emotional, of the parties (12); 5. the desirabil-
ity of awarding the marital home to the spouse receiving custody of the children (11);
6. occupation and vocational skills (11); 7. employability (11); 8. the opportunity of
each for future acquisition of capital assets and income (10); 9. whether the property
division is in lieu of, or in addition to, alimony (10); 10. debts of the parties (9); 11.
the value of the separate property of each (8); 12. station in lifelstandard of living
(8); 13. the estates of the parties (7); 14. conduct of the parties, including its relation
to the disposition or dissipation of the property (6); 15. prior marriages (6); 16.
agreements of the parties (antenuptial and/or separation) (5); 17. tax consequences
(5); 18. custody of the children (5); 19. the contribution of each in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of the respective estates (5); 20. retirement
benefits (4); 21. the contribution of one spouse to the other's education, training or
increased earning power (4); 22. the income and property of each at the time of the
marriage (3); 23. other just and equitable factors (3); 24. whether the property was
acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent (2); 25. the education of the parties (2);
26. job absence (2); 27. time needed by a spouse for training (2); 28. increases or
decreases in the value of the separate property during the marriage (1); 29. the cause
of the divorce (1); 30. depletion of separate property for marital purposes (1); 31. the
loss of inheritance and pension rights (1); 32. the liquid or non-liquid character of the
marital assets (1); 33. the difficulty of evaluating a component asset or an interest in a
business (1); 34. the merits of the parties (1); 35. burdens imposed on the property for
the benefit of either party or the children (1); 36. the nature and extent of the
community property (1); 37. the nature and extent of the separate property (1); and
38. the party through whom the property was acquired (1). See Appendix B for a
chart of the factors, listed by state. Each number that appears in the vertical column
of the chart identifies the factor introduced by the same number in this footnote.
171. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Supp. 1980).
172. The factors are: 1. the economic circumstances of each party at the time of
the division, particularly the amount and sources of income; 2. the contribution of
each to the acquisition of the marital property, including contributions as a home-
maker; 3. the duration of the marriage; 4. the desirability of awarding the marital
home to the spouse receiving custody of the children; 5. the opportunity of each for
future acquisition of capital assets and income; 6. debts of the parties; 7. the value of
the separate property of each; 8. the estates of the parties; 9. conduct of the parties,
but only as related to the disposition or dissipation of the property; 10. agreements of
the parties (antenuptial and/or separation); 11. tax consequences; 12. retirement
benefits; 13. the contribution of one spouse to the other's education, training or
increased earning power; 14. the contribution of each in the acquisition, preservation
or appreciation in value of the respective estates; 15. the income and property of each
19811
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tion of assets include: the contribution of each to the acquisition of the
marital property, including contributions as a homemaker; 173 the op-
portunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and in-
come; 174 the value of the separate property of each; 175 and the contri-
bution of each in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in
value of the respective estates. 176
Certain factors employed in property divisions, however, are inap-
propriate. For example, the age and health of the parties, 77 the time
needed for retraining, 178 child custody, 79 and job absence 80 are more
appropriate to an alimony determination, because they relate to the
financial needs of the parties. Station in life/standard of living' 8' and
at the time of the marriage; 16. other just and equitable factors; 17. whether the
property was acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; 18. increases or decreases
in the value of the separate property during the marriage; 19. depletion of separate
property for marital purposes; 20. the loss of inheritance and pension rights; 21. the
liquid or non-liquid character of the marital assets; 22. the difficulty of evaluating a
component asset or an interest in a business; 23. burdens imposed on the property for
the benefit of either party or the children; 24. the nature and extent of the commu-
nity property; 25. the nature and extent of the separate property; and 26. the party
through whom the property was acquired.
173. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1)(8) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
14-10-113(1)(a) (1973); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(6) (Supp. 1980).
174. E.g., D.C. Code Encycl. § 16-910(b) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Idaho Code §
32-712(1)(b)(6) (Supp. 1981); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503(c)(10) (Smith-Hurd 1980).
175. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190(1)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 722-A(1)(B) (1981); 1981 Mo. Legis. Serv. 546, 546
(Vernon) (to be codified at Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.330(1)(2) (Vernon)).
176. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46 b-81(c) (West Supp. 1981); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (Supp. 1980).
177. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1)(2) (Supp. 1981); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
46b-81(c) (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(3) (Supp. 1980);
D.C. Code Encycl. § 16-910(b) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Idaho Code § 32-712
(1)(b)(3) (Supp. 1981); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40. § 503(c)(7) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Iowa
Code Ann. § 598.21(1)(d) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West
Supp. 1981); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(5)(d)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(d)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
767.255(4) (West Supp. 1981).
178. Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(1)(f) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
767.255(6) (West Supp. 1981).
179. D.C. Code Encycl. § 16-910(b) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
40, § 503(c)(8) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(1)(f) (West Supp.
1981-1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255(6) (West Supp. 1981).
180. Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(1)(f) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
767.255(6) (West Supp. 1981).
181. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1)(2) (Supp. 1981); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
46b-81(c) (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(3) (Supp. 1980); Il1.
Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503(c)(7) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West
Supp. 1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(d)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
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prior marriages 82 are irrelevant. 183  In addition, the cause of the
divorce184 and the "merits of the parties" "s address the issue of fault,
which is a policy decision appropriately left with the legislature.
A listing of factors gives invaluable guidance to the fact finder and
the practitioner by providing a convenient checklist of the items that
the state feels are of importance in making an equitable division of the
property. Without such a list, there can be no predictability from case
to case as to what will be considered in the division. A "catch-all,"
however, such as "other just and equitable considerations," should be
included to take care of unusual situations. Although a "catch-all" is
only listed as a factor in three states,188 several other states accomplish
the same result by urging their courts to consider all relevant factors in
arriving at a just determination, not only those enumerated in their
statutes. 
87
IV. IN THE COURT'S DISCRErON
Despite great differences among the alimony and property division
statutes in this country, all awards of alimony and property division
are made by the court in the exercise of its discretion.
Appellate courts are designed to provide a certain amount of con-
trol over lower court decisions.18  When, however, a statute does not
list factors to be considered, but only provides that the property
division or alimony award is to be "equitable," the appellate court has
little information in the trial record on which to determine the propri-
182. Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(2) (Supp. 1980); D.C. Code Encycl. §
16-910(b) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1981);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(d)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); cf. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
40, § 503(c)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1980) (obligations and rights arising from a prior mar-
riage).
183. For a discussion of the relevance of station in life/standard of living, see supra
notes 115-16 and accompanying text. The only effect of prior marriages, in terms of a
property division, is that the value of property received from the divorce of the
previous marriage should be the separate property of that spouse. This factor may
have been included, however, because all five jurisdictions consider all property
acquired after the marriage to be marital property. Therefore, if after the marriage
one spouse receives a payment from an ex-spouse as part of the property division of
the first marriage, it would be presumed to be "marital property" of the second
marriage. Using this factor, then, allows the judge to take such a possibility into
account.
184. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (Vest Supp. 1981).
185. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1977).
186. Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(1)(m) (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Law § 236 pt. B(5)(d)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
767.255(12) (West Supp. 1981).
187. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-113 (Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §
1513(a) (Supp. 1980); Idaho Code § 31-712(1) (Supp. 1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 26.09.080 (Supp. 1981).
188. See Desvernine, supra note 122, at 236-37.
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ety of the award. The effectiveness of appellate review is undermined
in two additional ways. First, only a small percentage of the divorce
cases heard each year reach the appellate level. The trial court's
discretion, therefore, is "not often subject to check." ,89 Second, the
appellate courts frequently resort to presumptions to uphold the trial
court's discretion, leading one commentator to suspect that insuffi-
cient evidence is available in the trial court record on which to base
the decision.19 0 These presumptions are still used today. One court
has recognized "that the trial court has broad discretion," and there-
fore declined to "modify or set ...aside [the property division and
alimony award] unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its
discretion."'91 Another court noted that "upon appeal it is presumed
that the trial court exercised its discretion properly," and indicated it
would reverse "only where there is a clear abuse of discretion." 102
The UMDA attempted to prevent abuse of judicial discretion by
requiring that separate property be returned to each spouse and al-
lowing the court to divide only marital property. 13 As noted, how-
ever, only five states enacted the UMDA, 94 and it cannot be said that
the statutory changes enacted in recent years have corrected the prob-
lem. Appellate courts in many jurisdictions have been forced to over-
turn clearly excessive alimony and property division awards in the last
three years.19 5 For example, in Petersen v. Petersen,',, the trial court
awarded the wife alimony and child support payments totalling 75 %
of the husband's income. 197 In In re McGrew,9 8 a woman with a net
worth of $329,829 was awarded maintenance of $200 per month. 9
In Blum v. Blum,20 0 an alimony award of more than $4,000 a month
189. Cooey, supra note 14, at 224.
190. Id. at 222-23.
191. Hansen v. Hansen, 273 N.W.2d 749, 751 (S.D. 1979) (per curiam) (citations
omitted).
192. In re Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), overruled on other
grounds, Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977).
193. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
195. E.g., Wise v. Wise, 396 So. 2d 111, 112-13 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (wife
awarded $890 per month in alimony and child support, leaving husband with $110
per month); Parham v. Parham, 385 So. 2d 107, 108-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(wife with net worth of $15,500 awarded $650 a month, while husband with take
home pay of $448 per week had greater liabilities than assets); Pettit v. Pettit, 85 I11.
App. 3d 280, 284-85, 406 N.E.2d 899, 903 (1980) (working wife earning $165 to $250
per week awarded 40 % of gross earnings of unemployed husband, who made $125
per week when he did work).
196. 301 N.W.2d 592 (Neb. 1981).
197. Id. at 595.
198. 90 Ill. App. 3d 27, 412 N.E.2d 996 (1980).
199. Id. at 32-33, 412 N.E.2d at 1000-01.
200. 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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left the husband $50 a week on which to live, without discharging any
of his other obligations.201
The best way to check abuse of discretion is to require by statute
both financial disclosure by the parties and written findings of fact
and conclusions of law by the judge. These provisions would serve a
dual purpose: first, causing the lower court to be more careful in its
reasoning and result, and second, ensuring that an appellate court
will have a sufficient record on which to decide if discretion was
abused.
It is inequitable for an appellate decision to be based on an incom-
plete record. The Texas Supreme Court, in a divorce case, stated that
"[i]n the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must
assume that the trial court took into consideration the entire circum-
stances of the parties."'20 2 An appellate court should never have to
make such an assumption. The only recourse for an appeals court is to
remand the case for further findings of fact.20 3 If written findings of
fact are mandated by statute, however, the additional cost and time
involved in further trial court proceedings would be unnecessary.
Financial disclosure is statutorily required in only three states.204 In
three other states, statutes specify that the court may require such
disclosure. 205  Delaware and Florida require an affidavit of depen-
dency from a party seeking alimony, which must specify the party's
financial needs.20 6 While other courts may at times use financial
information supplied by the parties to decide on a property division or
alimony award, 20 7 no other statutes specifically require either the
court to use such information or the parties to produce it.
Few statutes require written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Of those that do, only New York, Washington and West Virginia
require them in all cases.2 08 In Iowa, only the factors "relevant to the
201. Id. at 54-55.
202. Whittenberg v. Whittenberg, 523 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)
(emphasis added).
203. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 602, 244 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1978); Pierce
v. Pierce, 274 S.E.2d 514, 515-16 (W. Va. 1981).
204. Ga. Code Ann. § 30-105(6) (1980); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(1)(e) (1979).
205. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.22 (Supp. 1981-1982); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 458:19 (1968); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 754 (Supp. 1981).
206. Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(b) (Supp. 1980); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.611(a)
(Supp. 1981).
207. E.g., In re Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 655-56, 397 N.E.2d 511, 513-14 (1979);
In re Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 422 (Iowa 1980); Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d
176, 178-79, 226 N.W.2d 518, 519 (1975).
208. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(b) (MeKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.08.110 (1961); W. Va. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1978). The New York
statute goes so far as to expressly proscribe waiver of the requirement by the parties.
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 pt. B(6)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
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case" need be in the written opinion. 200  In Arkansas, the basis and
reasons for the decision "should" be in writing if the marital property
is not divided equally. 210 If, however, the court chooses to invade one
spouse's separate property, the basis and reasons "must" be in writ-
ing.21' In Pennsylvania, the findings on the question of alimony, but
not property division, must be written. 212 In California and Oregon,
the parties can request the court to enter written findings of fact on
the question of alimony, and the court must do so if requested.2 1 3
CONCLUSION
There is little uniformity in the United States in the law of alimony
and property division. As is its prerogative, each state may choose to
handle the division of property or the award of alimony in any way it
deems proper.2 14
Certain statutory provisions, however, aid the achievement of more
equitable results in the complex area of divorce legislation. Therefore,
the following recommendations are made:
1. Both alimony and property division statutes should include a list
of factors to be considered in making the award. These factors will
provide the courts guidance as to what items are considered important
by the state.
2. Financial disclosure by both parties should be required by stat-
ute. If the court cannot evaluate the parties' assets, no equitable
decision can be reached.
3. Written findings of fact and conclusions of law should be re-
quired with respect to both property division and alimony awards.
209. Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21(7) (West Supp. 1981-1982). If written findings arc
to limit judicial discretion and aid appellate review, permitting the lower court judge
to decide which factors are "relevant to the case" is unwise. So subjective a standard
invites the interjection of judicial prejudices that evade review.
210. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Supp. 1981).
211. Id. § 34-1214(A)(2).
212. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 501(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
213. Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(1)(c)
(1979).
214. The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife.., belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). As a result, the
Court overrides state statutes and court decisions only when they are inconsistent
with the Constitution or federal legislation. E.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct.
2728, 2736-37 (1981) (pensions of active service members in the U.S. military are
separate, not community, property); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (sex
discrimination in alimony statutes by awarding alimony only to wives unconstitu-
tional); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979) (Railroad Retirement Act
pensions are separate property); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (mlsce-
gination statutes unconstitutional).
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Such a requirement will both make the lower court more objective in
reaching a decision and provide the appellate court with a firm foun-
dation upon which to -determine whether the lower court abused its
discretion.
Implementation of these three recommendations should result in
more uniformity of decision by courts within a state and ensure that




FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN AWARDING ALIMONY
AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI ID IL IA KY LAMDMA
1. x x X x x x x X x x x X - x x XX
2. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
3. x x x x x x x x x X x x x x x
4. x x x x x x x x x X x x x
5. x x x x x x x x x x x x
6. x x x x x x x x x
7. x x x x x x x x
8. x x x x x x x x
9. x x x x x x
10. x x x x
11. x x x x x x
12. x x
13. x x x x















* See supra note 95 for citations to the relevant statutes of each state
listed in this appendix. United States Post Office abbreviations for states
are used in this chart.
FACTORS:
1. The financial resources of each, including whatever share of marital
property each was awarded.
2. Duration of the marriage.
3. Age and health.
4. Station in life/standard of living.
5. Time needed for the education of the party seeking support.
6. Child support responsibilities, including the ability to work while
having custody of the children.
7. Earning capacity of each.
8. The ability of the other spouse to pay.
9. Needs of the parties.
10. Contribution to the marriage, including as a homemaker.




15. The educational level of the parties.
16. The contribution by one spouse to the other's education.
17. Employment history.
18. Retirement benefits.
19. Agreements of the parties (antenuptial and/or separation).
20. The property interests of each.
21. Interruption of career or education.
22. Expectancies and inheritances.
23. The property brought to the marriage.
24. The duration of the need of support.
25. The conduct of the party seeking support.
26. Dissipation of assets.
27. Insurance.
28. Excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or
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APPENDIX A (continued)
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN AWARDING ALIMONY
MN MO MT NB NJ NY NC OH OR PA RI VA WAWV WI
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1.
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2.
x x x x x x x x x x x 3.
x x x x x x x x x x 4.
x x x x x x x x 5.
x x x x x x x x x x 6.
x x x x x x x x 7.
x x x x x x 8.
x x x x x 9.
x x x x x x x 10.
x x x x 11.
x x x 12.
x x x 13.
x x 14.
x x x x 15.
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APPENDIX B*
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN AWARDING PROPERTY DIVISION
50
ARCO CTDEDC ID IL IN IA KY MEMNMOMT NY OR PA RI WA WI WY
1. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
2. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
3. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
4. x x x x x x x x x x x x
5. x x x x x x x x x x x
6. x x x x x x x x x x x
7. x x x x x x x x x x x
8. x x x x x x x x x x
9. x x x x x x x x x x
10. x x x x x x x x x
11. x x x x x x x x
12. x x x x x x x x
13. x x x x x x x
14. x x x x x x
15. x x x x x x
16. x x x x x
17. x x x x
18. x x x x x
19. x x x x x
20. x x x x
21. x x x x
22. x x x
















* See supra note 169 for citations to the relevant statutes of each state listed in this
appendix. United States Post Office abbreviations for states are used in this chart.
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APPENDIX B (continued)
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN AWARDING PROPERTY DIVISION
FACTORS:
1. The economic circumstances of each party at the time of the division, particularly the amol
and sources of income.
2. The contribution of each to the acquisition of the marital property, including contributions z
homemaker.
3. The duration of the marriage.
4. The age and health, both physical and emotional, of the parties.
5. The desirability of awarding the marital home to the spouse receiving custody of the childr
6. Occupation and vocational skills.
7. Employability.
8. The opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.
9. Whether the property division is in lieu of, or in addition to, alimony.
10. Debts of the parties.
11. The value of the separate property of each.
12. Station in life/standard of living.
13. The estates of the parties.
14. Conduct of the parties, including its relation to the disposition or dissipation of the properi
15. Prior marriages.
16. Agreements of the parties (antenuptial and/or separation).
17. Tax -onsequences.
18. Custody of the children.
19. The contribution of each in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of
respective estates.
20. Retirement benefits.
21. The contribution of one spouse to the other's education, training or increased earning pow
22. The income and property of each at the time of the marriage.
23. Other just and equitable factors.
24. Whether the property was acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent.
25. The education of the parties.
26. Job absence.
27. Time needed by a spouse for training.
28. Increases or decreases in the value of the separate property during the marriage.
29. The cause of the divorce.
30. Depletion of separate property for marital purposes.
31. The loss of inheritance and pension rights.
32. The liquid or non-liquid character of the marital assets.
33. The difficulty of evaluating a component asset or an interest in a business.
34. The merits of the parties.
35. Burdens imposed on the property for the benefit of either party or the children.
36. The nature and extent of the community property.
37. The nature and extent of the separate property.
38. The party through whom the property was acquired.
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